A Philosophical Framework for the Validation of Information Systems 
Concepts by Khazanchi, Deepak
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 1996 Proceedings Americas Conference on Information Systems(AMCIS)
8-16-1996
A Philosophical Framework for the Validation of
Information Systems Concepts
Deepak Khazanchi
College of Business, Northern Kentucky University, khazanchi@nku.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis1996
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 1996 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Khazanchi, Deepak, "A Philosophical Framework for the Validation of Information Systems Concepts" (1996). AMCIS 1996
Proceedings. 42.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis1996/42
A Philosophical Framework for the Validation of Information Systems 
Concepts 
Deepak Khazanchi, Assistant Professor of Information Systems,  
College of Business, Northern Kentucky University 
Highland Heights, KY 41099 
E-mail: khazanchi@nku.edu 
1. What does it mean to validate concepts?  
2. What are the criteria?  
Both philosophers and scientists have been unable to agree about the answers to these questions. [adapted 
from Shannon, 1975, p. 211]. 
The question of validating concepts and conceptual models has always been a 
troublesome and, at times, bewildering one for both philosophers and scientists in most 
disciplines. There is little agreement on the meaning of concepts, let alone their validity. 
Einstein had little evidence for supporting his conception of relativity when it was first 
proposed. In essence, conceptual development provides a means of crisply defining and 
elaborating ideas regarding certain phenomena. 
The IS (Information Systems) field is faced with this difficulty more so than other social 
sciences because of its diverse constituents, ever-changing contextual environment 
(technology), and relatively short life span.  
Rigby [1965, p. 16] correctly asserts that "the possibility of inventing concepts provides 
the opportunity for developing different ways for thinking about the same phenomenon... 
The phenomenon does not differ--only the way of thinking about it differs...The process 
of inventing concepts is an integral part in the growth and development of a discipline." 
A relatively new discipline such as IS (as compared to others in the social sciences such 
as Marketing) needs such invention of concepts for it to continue to evolve as a distinct 
field of endeavor. This can be better achieved if their is an understanding between all 
concerned about the means of developing concepts and building conceptual models that 
have validity. 
Validation assures that a concept (or each construct in a conceptual model) contains the 
features imputed to it in their individual definitions/description. In other words, a valid 
concept implies that it is well-grounded, sound or capable of being justified. The 
response of an IS empiricist to the question "How do we validate?" could be a cynical 
retort -- design an experiment or build a prototype and test your concept or conceptual 
model. But, a fundamental problem with this approach, notwithstanding the assumptions 
inherent in statistical experimental design, is the presupposition of the "validity" of a 
concept or conceptual model. That is, a belief in the notion that mere definition implies 
that a concept has "face validity." If simply using a "term" made it acceptable to a 
discipline, one would never reach an agreement on commonly held truisms or knowledge 
of that discipline. This paradox and the absence of a such an organized basis for use by IS 
researchers and philosophers in their scientific endeavors is key motivation for this 
article.  
Therefore, this paper attempts to integrate notions from the philosophy of social sciences, 
the information systems (IS) field and its referent disciplines and sets forth a framework 
for the validation of IS concepts. The proposed philosophical framework for validation of 
concepts and conceptual models consists of a set of "criteria for validation" of concepts. 
As a concept satisfies each succeeding criteria its potential ability to have inherent "truth 
content" with regard to its general acceptance in the field strengthens. After all, "... 
concept formation and theory formation in science go hand in hand.... [T]he better our 
concepts, the better the theory we can formulate with them, and in turn, the better the 
concepts available for the next improved theory." [Paraphrased from Kaplan, 1964, p. 52-
54].  
Criteria for Validation of Concepts 
1. Is it plausible (Plausibility)? A concept or conceptual model is plausible if it has face 
validity. This criterion is useful to assess the apparent reasonableness of an idea. This 
could be demonstrated by tautologous corroboration or deduction from past research or 
theories, or, it could be developed on the basis of observation or induction. Plausibility 
establishes that a concept or model is more than just a belief or conjecture.  
2. Is it feasible (Feasibility)? This criterion dictates that a concept or conceptual model, at 
the least, has the quality of being workable or operationalizable. In addition to being 
plausible, a feasible concept or conceptual model would be operational in that it would be 
amenable to verbal, graphical, mathematical, illustrative, prototypical characterization.  
3. Is effective (Effectiveness)? This criterion addresses the question: How effectively 
does the concept or conceptual model describe the phenomena under study? In addition 
an effective concept or conceptual model has the potential of serving our scientific 
purposes [Kaplan, 1964]. An effective concept not only represents the phenomenon in 
question parsimoniously, it also guides and stimulates other scientific inquiries.  
4. Is it pragmatic? The pragmatism criterion dictates that a concept or conceptual model 
not be restrictive to the extent of logically excluding previously valid concepts or 
conceptual models. Thus, this criterion provides that concepts or conceptual models 
should subsume, for obviously practical reasons, any conceptual structures that 
previously explained related phenomenon. Hunt [1990] illustrates this criterion with the 
example of Newton's law. He argues that simple pragmatism would require that any new 
conceptual development could not preclude Newton's laws (as in the case of Relativity, 
where these laws are a special case subsumed within relativity). In effect this criterion 
emphasizes that concepts and conceptual models should have some degree of abstract, 
logical self-consistency or coherence with other concepts and conceptual models in the 
discipline.  
5. Is it empirical? (Does it have empirical content?) Empirical content implies that a 
concept or conceptual model must be "empirically testability" [Hunt, 1990]. In this vein, 
Dewey also affirms that although concepts can be developed without reference to direct 
observation, and although this logical conceptual development is indispensable to the 
growth of science, the ultimate test of a concept or conceptual model lies in having the 
ability to empirically collect data to "corroborate" it. "Elaboration by reasoning may 
make a suggested idea very rich and very plausible, but it will not settle the validity of 
that idea" asserts Dewey [1933, p. 183].  
6. Is it predictive? (Does it explain a phenomenon that is expected to occur?) The essence 
of this criterion is best described in the words of Rashevsky (1954, p. 152-3): "A theory 
or theoretical concept is considered the more convenient or useful, the better it enables us 
to predict facts that hitherto have not been observed... The scientist constructs theories, 
theoretical concepts or theoretical frames of reference that are isomorphic with the world 
of observable phenomena. This isomorphism is never complete, never covers the whole 
range of observable phenomena... wider the range of isomorphism, the greater predictive 
value of the theory." Thus, a concept or conceptual model that is predictive would, at the 
least, demonstrate that given certain antecedent conditions, the corresponding phenomena 
was somehow expected to occur [Hunt, 1990].  
7. Is it intersubjectively certifiable? Hunt [1990], Nagel [1979], and others argue that all 
scientific knowledge, and in consequence, concepts or conceptual models "must be 
objective in the sense of being intersubjectively certifiable." This criterion provides that 
concepts or conceptual models must be "testable by different investigators (thus inter-
subject)." Investigators with differing philosophical stance must be able to verify the 
imputed truth content of these concepts or conceptual structures through observation, 
logical evaluation, or experimentation.  
8. Is it intermethodologically certifiable? In addition to being intersubjectively certifiable, 
this related criterion provides that investigators using different research methodologies 
must be able to test the veracity of the concept or conceptual model and predict the 
occurrence of the same phenomenon. 
With regard to the above criteria for validation of concepts and conceptual models, one 
example in the IS field comes to mind: the work of Davis [1989] and Davis et al. [1989] 
relating to the development of the technology acceptance model (TAM) and the 
conceptualization of "perceived usefulness and ease of use" based upon a priori research 
and theories from diverse disciplines. Davis and associates demonstrated a linkage 
between perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, and user's attitudes, intentions 
and actual computer adoption behavior. Furthermore, Szajna's [1994] positive assessment 
of the predictability of Davis' [1989] technology acceptance model in an software choice 
situation exemplifies intersubjective certifiability of the TAM and the associated concepts 
of perceived usefulness/ease of use. Thus a concept or conceptual model that is plausible, 
feasible, effective, empirical, pragmatic, predictive, and, replicable (intersubjectively and 
intermethodologically certifiable) is more likely to be imputed with the same meaning to 
different investigators, conform to observable phenomena, and capable of explaining and 
predicting phenomena. 
In conclusion, it must be reiterated that having a unifying basis for validating IS concepts 
and encouraging concept creation is potentially the only way of achieving a stream of 
thought that is coherent and consistent, and which truly follows the scientific method. 
Once again in the words of Dewey [1933] "conceptions are standards of reference... 
concepts enable us to generalize, to extend and carry over our understanding from one 
thing to another" [p. 149-50] and "... conceptions are the intellectual instrumentalities that 
are brought to bear upon the material of sense perception and of recollection in order to 
clarify the obscure, to bring order into seeming conflict, and unity into the fragmentary" 
(p. 179). But, in order for such a concept to be "generally" applicable and accepted it 
must be valid. By no means is the list of criteria discussed here meant to be prescriptive 
or exhaustive; but, they do serve as a minimum set of desirable qualities of valid 
concepts.  
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to 
mean--neither more nor less."  
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master--that's all." [Lewis Carroll in Alice in 
Wonderland]. 
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